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CASE COMMENTS
ever, the United States Supreme Court's decision in Carignan and the
use of the more enlightened procedure followed in a majority of
jurisdictions reflects growing concern whether practice here follows
theory.
28
In an analogous situation, dissatisfaction with this procedural de-
vice of instructing the jury to disregard evidence was expressed in
United States ex rel, Scoleri v. Banmiller.29 During the trial and be-
fore conviction of Banmiller, the state introduced evidence of the
defendant's prior criminal record as relevant to the question of the
penalty to be imposed if the jury found him guilty of first degree
murder, but not on the question of guilt itself. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the evidence, even
with an instruction to the jury to disregard on the question of guilt
itself, was so prejudicial that it constituted a denial of due process
of law. Similarly, an instruction to the jury to disregard a confession
ruled inadmissible by the trial judge would seem to be so prejudicial
to the defendant that this procedure, too, should be considered as
constituting a denial of due process.
GERmAD LEE KEsm
MISCONDUCT DURING AN INTERLOCUTORY
DIVORCE PERIOD
In several states the statutes provide that parties to a divorce suit
must wait a specified period of time after entry of an initial divorce
decree before the divorce becomes final.1 The preliminary decree is
known as an interlocutory decree in some states,2 and as a decree nisi in
2E.g., Tooisgah v. United States, 137 F.2d 713, 716 (ioth Cir. 1943); State v.
Pulliam, 87 Ariz. 216, 349 P.2d 781 (1g6o); House v. State, 23o Ark. 622, 324 S.W.2d
112 ('959); State v. Taborsky, 147 Conn. 194, 158 A.2d 239 (1960); State v. Seward, 163
Kan. 136, 181 P.2d 478 (1947); State v. Thomas, 2o8 La. 548, 23 So. 2d 212 (1945);
Hawkins v. State, 193 Miss. 586, 10 So. 2d 678 (1942); Harrold v. Territory, 18
Okla. 395, 89 Pac. 2o2 (1907); State v. Harrison, 236 S.C. 246, 113 S.E.2d 783 (196o);
State v. Hinz, 78 S.D. 442, 103 N.W.2d 656 (196o).
- 3 1o F.2d 720 (3 d Cir. 1962).
"Cal. Civil Code § 131 (Deering 196o); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1534 (1953);
D.C. Code Ann. § 16-421 (1961); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 2o8 § 21 (1955); Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 42-340 (1952); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A: 3 4 -19 (1952); N.Y. Practice Manual §
1176 (Clevenger 1962); R.I Gen. Laws Ann. § 15-5-23 (1956); Vt. Stat. tit. 14 ch.
3215 (1947)-
2Cal. Civil Code § 131 (Deering ig6o); D.C. Code Ann. § 16-421 (1961) (six
months before the decree becomes final plus an additional 9o days called an inter-
locutory period); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-340 (1952); N.Y. Practice Manual § 1176
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others.3 The waiting period between the interlocutory decree and
the final decree varies from three months4 to six months,5 and a year.0
The parties' martial status is not terminated until the final decree
and so, during this interim period, remarriage is forbidden.7
Several reasons are given for these statutory interim periods. The
principal one is that the parties are given a chance for reconciliation.8
Another reason sometimes given is that it prevents speedy divorce
and hasty remarriage, and so generally serves as a deterrent to divorce.9
It is also said that the period permits the determination of a child's
paternity,10 and gives the party not present at an ex parte divorce
hearing an opportunity to present defenses.'
Two interesting questions concerning interlocutory divorce decrees
confronted the Rhode Island Supreme Court in the recent case of
Pakuris v. Pakuris.12 In this case the wife petitioned for and was
awarded an absolute divorce, custody of the parties' minor child,
and an allowance for the support of the child. Rhode Island's divorce
laws provide for a six months waiting period before the initial decree
is made final.13 During this six months period the husband moved to
change the custody of the child, and the wife filed a motion to hold
the husband in contempt of court for failing to make his support
payments. At a hearing upon these motions, the husband was held in
contempt. However, the wife admitted at this hearing that she was
living with another man as his wife and stated her intentions of mar-
rying this other man as soon as the divorce decree becomes final.
After the hearing, but before the expiration of the six months
(Clevenger 1962); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 15-5-23 (1956) (not specifically called an
interlocutory decree by statute, but the equivalent of one).
'Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1534 (1953); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 20o8, § 21 (1955); N.J.
Rev. Stat. § 2A:3 4-19 (1952); Vt. Stat. tit. 14 ch. 3215 (1947).
'Del. Code Ann. tit. 13 § 1534 (1953); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A:3 4 -I 9 (1952); N.Y.
Practice Manual § 1176 (Clevenger 1962).
Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 208, § 21 (1955); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-340 (1952); R.I.
Gen. Laws Ann. § 15-5-23 (1956); Vt. Stat. tit. 14 ch. 3215 (1947).
GCal. Civil Code § 131 (Deering 196o).
'See statutes cited note i supra, and Olson v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. 250,
165 Pac. 706 (1917).
8Olson v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. 25o, 165 Pac. 706 (1i17); Lane v. Superior
Court, 1o4 Cal. App. 340, 285 Pac. 860 (Dist. Ct. App. 1930); Bajakian v. Bajakian,
57 R.I. 470, 19o At. 461 (1937); Berger v. Berger 44 RI. 295, 117 Ad. 361 (1922).
'Grannis v. Superior Court, 146 Cal. 245, 79 Pac. 891 (igo5).
"Lane v. Superior Court, 1o4 Cal. App. 340, 285 Pac. 86o (Dist. Ct. App. 1930).
"See Scolardi v. Scolardi, 42 R.I. 456, io8 Ad. 651 (190o).
3t86 A.2d 719 (R.I. 1962).
"3R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 15-5-23 (1956).
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waiting period, the husband filed a motion objecting to the entry of
the final decree. His objection was on the grounds that his wife's con-
duct with another man constituted misconduct barring her rights to a
final decree. The trial justice sustained his motion, and denied the
wife her final decree. The wife took exception to the trial justice's
ruling, arguing that her misconduct did not bar her rights to a final
decree, and further pointing out that the Rhode Island statute 4 does
not expressly provide for the denial of a final decree for misconduct
on the part of the prevailing party during the waiting period. How-
ever, the Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld the trial justice's
ruling and held that the wife's action constituted misconduct barring
her rights to a final decree. In defining misconduct the court said:
"[T]he prevailing party must continue to comply with the alle-
gations of the petition for divorce, pertaining to his or her con-
duct, up to the time of the entry of the final decree and any
conduct which would bar a decision for divorce on the original
petition presents grounds for contesting entry of the final
decree."' 5
The Rhode Island Supreme Court reasoned that, even in the absence
of an express statutory provision prohibiting misconduct, the six
months waiting period was intended by the legislature to offer the
parties an opportunity to become reconciled and that misconduct on
the part of the prevailing party is contrary to any notion of reconcili-
ation.
Several states have concluded that misconduct on the part of the
prevailing party before the final decree is grounds for contesting the
entry of the final decree.' 6
Two cases concerning misconduct have been decided by the Su-
Supreme Court of Michigan.' 7 The applicable statute provides a six
months waiting period in every divorce case where there are depen-
"Ibid.
!Pakuris v. Pakuris, 186 A.2d 719, 721 (R.I. 1962).
"Weeks v. Superior Court, 187 Cal. 620, 203 Pac. 93 (1921); Vinyard v. Vin-
yard, 43 Del. 222, 48 A.2d 497 (Super. Ct. 1946); Waurinevich v. Waurinevich, 170
A.2d 709 (Del. Super. Ct. i96i); Moors v. Moors, 121 Mass. (7 Lathrop) 232 (1876);
Linn v. Linn, 341 Mich. 668, 69 N.W.2d 147 (1955); Pfender v. Pfender, 104 N.J.
Eq. 107, 144 Ad. 333 (Ch. 1929); Helbig v. Helbig, 1o3 N.J. Eq. 348, 143 Ad.
338 (Ct. Err. & App. 1928); Burgher v. Burgher, 184 Misc. 682, 54 N.Y.S.2d 683
(Sup. Ct. 1945); Pakuris v. Pakuris, 186 A.2d 719 (R.I. 1962); White v. White, 167
Wis. 61 5 , 168 N.W. 704 (1918).
"'Linn v. Linn, 341 Mich. 668, 69 N.W.2d 147 (1955); Curtis v. Curtis, 330
Mich. 63, 46 N.W.2d 460 (195i).
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dent children under the age of seventeen.' 8 In Curtis v. Curtis,19 the
wife admitted she had become engaged to another man within the
six months before the entry of the final decree, and that she had oc-
casionally shown her affections towards him. The husband moved to
vacate the final decree, contending this constituted misconduct bar-
ring her right to a final decree. But the Michigan Supreme Court
held there was no showing of any misconduct on her part that would
indicate moral depravity, or that she was an unfit custodian of the
child.2 0 Within a few years the Michigan court was faced with a
similar case, Linn v. Linn,21 where the husband after a final decree
petitioned the court to set it aside because of the wife's alleged miscon-
duct during the interlocutory period. The wife, after prevailing in a
divorce proceeding, had committed adultery and had become pregnant
prior to the entry of the final decree. The court set aside the final decree
because it thought the concealment by the wife of her immoral conduct
during the interlocutory period constituted a fraud upon the court.
One state has concluded that misconduct on the part of the pre-
vailing party before the final decree is not grounds for contesting the
entry of the final decree. The Supreme Court of Washington in State
ex rel. Hansen v. Superior Court22 held that the final decree should
be entered even though the prevailing party had committed adultery
or had attempted to remarry during the interlocutory period. The
court said:
"To apply such a rule under any conceivable facts except those
tending to perpetuation of the marriage would mean that in
every case the defeated party would only be required to charge
that the other had given cause for divorce after the entry of
the interlocutory decree and thereupon the whole case would be
opened up for relitigation."
23
The import of the Washington decision is that the parties will be
denied the final decree only when the circumstances show they have
voluntarily reconciled during the interlocutory period, and intend to
perpetuate the marriage.
The language of the Michigan and other decisions, indicates that
"Mich. Comp. Laws § 552.9 (1948), as amended by Mich. Comp. Laws § 552.9
(1956) now provides for a six months "cooling off" period before litigation begins.
See infra note 31.
"330 Mich. 63, 46 N.W.2d 460 (1951).
2DIbid.
21341 Mich. 668, 69 N.W.2d 147 (1955).
"131 Wash. 13, 228 Pac. 702 (1924). But see State ex rel. Chaudain v. Superior
Court, i8o Wash. 115, 39 P.2d 389 (1934), and especially the dissenting opinion.
sState ex rel. Hensen v. Superior Court, 131 Wash. 13, 228 Pac. 702 (1924).
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misconduct is a ground for denying a final divorce decree because it
is inconsistent with the promotion of a reconciliation, the theory of
the interlocutory period.2 4 Yet the only conduct that has this effect
is that which indicates moral depravity, or which would originally have
been grounds for divorce. For a party to become engaged to another
during the interlocutory period is as incompatible with a reconcilia-
tion, as the commission of adultery, but only adultery is a ground for
denying the final decree.25 The Michigan cases discussed earlier are
hard to reconcile. As a practical matter there would have been more
reason to uphold the final decree in the Michigan case involving
adultery. There, the wife not only remarried, but she was bearing
another man's child.2 6 Certainly she and her first husband were
beyond reconciliation; and it would appear that public policy would
favor upholding the unborn child's legitimacy.
Better reasoning would suggest that misconduct should be abol-
ished altogether as a grounds for contesting a final decree. Misconduct
has little to do with the opportunity for a reconciliation or the op-
portunity to present defenses in a divorce suit. Remarriage is still
forbidden until the final decree, and the paternity of the children can
still be determined. But to include misconduct as a grounds for con-
testing, or setting aside the final decree, prolongs litigation, forces
unwilling parties to continue a marriage, and produces no beneficial
results.
Even with the abolition of misconduct, reconciliation still re-
mains a basis for denying the final decree. But reconciliation as the
theory underlying the interlocutory period and also as a basis for
contesting the final decree is mutually inconsistent, because there
has been a failure to distinguish between an attempt to reconcile and
a bona fide reconciliation. This is evident in the Washington case of
Walker v. Walker2 7 where the husband was awarded an interlocutory
decree, and then, he and his spouse sporadically cohabited in en-
2 Cases cited note 16 supra; see notes 19, 20 supra and accompanying text.
'Compare Linn v. Linn, note 17 supra, with Curtis v. Curtis, note 17 supra.
Note 16 Colum. L. Rev. 228, 23o n.13 (1956). See Helbig v. Helbig, 1o3 N.J. Eq.
348, 143 Ad. 338, 339 (Ct. Err. & App. 1928 ) , where the court said, "A mere pre-
tense will not do, even though the offending spouse intended to actually go through
with a real adultery and thought he was doing so when interrupted at almost
the last moment." 143 Ati. 338, 339. It is submitted that "almost adultery" is as
inconsistent with notions of reconciliation as a "completed adultery." Certainly,
the other spouse will not be more eager to become reconciled because his spouse
was interrupted at the last moment.
-"In the Linn case, supra note 25, the wife married the man responsible for
her pregnancy as soon as the final decree was entered.
"151 Wash. 480, 276 Pac. 300 (1929).
1963]
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deavor to effect a permanent reconciliation. A final decree was entered,
and he remarried a third person. Later, the wife had the final decree
set aside on the ground that the sporadic cohabitation constituted
reconciliation. It is difficult to see any permanent reconciliation
under these circumstances; the husband certainly did not feel recon-
ciled with his wife, or he would not have had the final decree entered,
nor would he have remarried. It would appear that the interlocutory
period inconsistently provides the opportunity for reconciliation but
denies the parties a final decree if they seek to utilize this oppor-
tunity. Under these circumstances, reconciliation is discouraged in-
stead of being encouraged. Parties to an interlocutory decree would
do well to stay apart rather than run the risk of having a court-estab-
lished reconciliation forced upon them.28
As might be expected, the impact of the interlocutory decree on
the divorce rate and reconciliation is negligible.29 The damage to
the marital relationship has already been done by the time the inter-
locutory decree is entered, and the parties are usually beyond recon-
ciliation by this time.3 0 Consequently, some states have provided
for a "cooling off" period before litigation begins, the theory being that
the climate is more favorable to reconciliation before litigation.3 '
'Another example of a "court-established reconciliation" is Slusher v. Slusher,
85 Cal. App. 2d 626, 193 P.2d 778 (1948). Here, the wife acquired an interlocutory de-
cree and then she and her husband attempted to reconcile by living together over
a period of approximately seven months. The reconciliation failed, the wife alleged,
because the husband beat her, forced her to stay out in the yard, cursed her in
front of the parties' minor children, and was constantly intoxicated. Then, the hus-
band alleged the wife's sole motive in attempting to reconcile was to obtain a
larger share of the property. The court held there was a reconciliation. It is
clear under such circumstances that the only reconciliation here was one estab-
lished by the court, and that there was no semblance of an actual recondiliation
between the parties. As to the approaches taken regarding reconciliation, see
Helbush v. Helbush, 2o9 Cal. 758, 29o Pac. 19 (i93o); Nacht v. Nacht, 167 Cal. App.
2d 254, 334 P.2d 275 (1959); Nemer v. Nemer, 117 Cal. App. 2d 35, 254 P.2d 661
(1953); Peters v. Peters 16 Cal. App. 2d 383, 6o P.2d 313 (1936); Ruggles v. Bailey,
15 Cal. App. 2d 555, 59 P.2d 8 37 (193 6); Kronman v. Kronman, 129 Cal. App. so,
18 P.2d 712 (1933); Hawkins v. Hawkins, 1o4 Cal. App. 608, 286 Pac. 747 (1930);
Lane v. Superior Court, 104 Cal. App. 340, 285 Pac. 86o (lg3o); Krussman v. Kruss-
man, 25 Del. (2 Boyce) 25, 78 At. 642 (Super. Ct. i91o); Cary v. Cary, 144 App.
Div. 846, 129 N.Y. Supp. 444 (sgil); Lund v. Lund, 6 Wash. 2d 425, 315 P.2d 856
(1957); Tarr v. Tarr, 184 Va. 443, 35 S.E.2d 401 (1945).
'See 3 Nelson, Divorce and Annulment, 133, 134, 135 (2d ed. 1945); note, 25
Brooklyn L. Rev. 313, 323 & n.58 (1958). "Of the 1,408 interlocutory decrees of di-
vorce or annulment entered in New York County in actions begun in 1952, only
three were vacated during the interlocutory period, and only one of these on
grounds of reconciliation." Note, j6 Colum. L. Rev. 228, 249, 250 & n.156 (1956).
IONelson, supra note 3o, at 135, 136; 15 Wash. & Lee L. Rev., 327, 332 (1958).
31These statutes provide that there will be no hearing on the complaint until
a specified time after the return day, date of issuance of summons, or first public
